以太坊2.0—信标链验证者的奖罚(2)

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锋哥论道区块链
发表时间:10月21日 06:02 icon

本节我们一起来简单的了解一下信标链验证者的奖罚!
【原文】
4. Slashings are penalties ranging from over 0.5 ETH up to a validator’s entire stake. An honest, secure validator cannot be slashed by the actions of other validators. For committing a slashable offence a validator loses at least 1/32 of their balance and is deactivated (“forced exit”). The validator is penalized as if it was offline for 8,192 epochs. The protocol also imposes an additional penalty based on how many others have been slashed near the same time. The basic formula for the additional penalty is: validator_balance*3*fraction_of_validators_slashed. An effect is that if ⅓ of all validators commit a slashable offence in a similar period of time, they lose their entire balance. The validator that reports a slashable offence gets a whistleblower’s reward.
5. Proposers of blocks that get finalized, obtain a sizable reward. Validators that are consistently online doing a good job accrue ~1/8 boost to their total rewards for proposing blocks with new attestations. When a slashing happens, proposers also get a small reward for including the slashing evidence in a block. In eth2 Phase 0, all of the whistleblower’s reward actually goes to the proposer.
6. Ethereum 2.0 is a system with many mechanisms, some that can be appreciated more by their overall effects. The designed rewards and penalties culminate in an inactivity leak penalty. This is severe and rare unlike typical risks in #3. Basically, if there have been more than four epochs since finality, validators suffer an inactivity penalty that increases quadratically until a checkpoint is finalized. The inactivity penalty (or “quadratic leak”) guarantees this type of outcome: if 50% of validators drop offline, blocks will start finalizing again after 18 days. The quadratic leak drains problematic validators to a forced exit so that other validators will become a ⅔ majority that can resume finality. The inactivity leak does not drain validators that are operating optimally. During an inactivity leak, attester rewards are zero; validators earn proposer and whistleblower rewards as usual.

【翻译】
4.罚没(Slashing)的力度下至 0.5 ETH,上至一位验证者的全部权益。如果一位验证者所提交的见证消息触犯了协议所定义的罚没条件,则 TA 会损失自身权益的至少 1/32,并被驱逐出验证者队伍。惩罚的力度就像该验证者离线了 8192 个时段一样。协议还会根据相近时间内被罚没的验证者数量施加一个额外的惩罚。此种额外惩罚的计算公式是:验证者余额 × 3 × 被罚没的验证者占比。那么,如果占全体验证者 1/3 数量的验证者都触犯了罚没条件,则他们会失去全部余额。相应地,检举这些不轨行为的验证者将会得到检举人奖励。
5.区块提议者在所提议区块得到敲定之后,也会得到一个成比例奖励。总是在线,并且提议工作做得很好的验证者,其总奖励可增加约 1/8。出现罚没事件的时候,提议者也会因为打包罚没证据而得到一小笔奖励。在 Eth2 Phase 0 中,所有的检举人奖励都会给予区块提议者。
6.以太坊 2.0 系统中机制众多,对这些机制的评价应从所有机制的整体效果出发。最末一种奖惩措施是所谓的 “怠惰惩罚”。基本上,如果距上一次敲定区块已过去了 4 个时段(还没有新检查点得到敲定),所有验证者都会遭受怠惰惩罚,而且惩罚力度会呈平方级上升,直至新的检查点得到敲定。怠惰惩罚保证了:即使 50% 的验证者都离线了,系统也会在 21 天后重新开始敲定区块。

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文章标题: 以太坊2.0—信标链验证者的奖罚(2)